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THE ILLEGALITY OF PROGRESS PAYMENTS AS A
MEANS OF FINANCING GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTORS
C. S. McClelland*
When we should write anything into the statutes, it is better
to do it that way than to leave it to Department rules and
regulations, because the Department rules and regulations
mean one thing and the law means another.'

Many are familiar with the business policy of appealing to
the individual to "buy now, pay later," which allows the purchaser to secure actual delivery and use of the subject matter
of the sale by paying little, if anything, at the time of delivery.
Many more are equally unfamiliar with the fact that by applying an earlier Comptroller General's decision so widely as to
destroy the effectiveness of a clear statutory prohibition of long
standing, the executive agencies of the Government for a number of years have been pursuing a contrary policy. By a broad
use of the Comptroller's decision, in which possession of title
is equated to the possession of the subject matter required by
the statute, and which declares an exception in the statute which
expressly precludes any exception, executive agencies have
A.B., George Washington University, 1939, LL.B., 1933, M.A., 1940.
Hearings on H.R. 9822 to Expedite Naval Shipbuilding, House Committee
on Naval Affairs, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 3170 (1940).
*
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been continuously advancing great sums of public funds in direct
contravention of the statute, and without interest, to various
businesses as "progress payments" for goods or services not
delivered or furnished at the time the funds were paid.
These sums are a very substantial part of the progress payments which, in the Department of Defense alone, excluding construction contracts, appear to have been allowed to remain outstanding and unliquidated in a sum exceeding $4 billion a year,
exclusive of interest. As a result, they have become a serious
factor in creating a tight money market, with all the crises such a
market can have, and has had, for both Government and private
business, and in threatening the national debt limitation.2 As such
a threat to the extent of well over $4 billion annually, such illicit
use of public funds stands out in bold, and disreputable, relief
against post-Sputnik reports of Government economy measures
to save $1 or $2 billion which should have been spent on
missile projects. Nevertheless, while the unauthorized circumvention of the statute has been proceeding on a large scale at
the expense of such vital projects, and since no one in a position
of responsibility for detecting and disclosing the matter has done
so and demanded an accounting, the executive agencies have
piously sought from time to time, and Congress, apparently
without ascertaining for itself the actual significance of executive policies on the prohibitory statute, has solemnly approved
legislation authorizing circumvention in certain comparatively
minor situations and left the great volume of circumvention
without legislative sanction or attention. Concurrently, and undaunted by the sweeping language of the statutory prohibition
which stipulates that "No advance of public money shall be made
in any case . . ," (emphasis added) 3 certain executive agencies
2 .Hearings before the Subcommittee on Participation of Small Business in
Military Procurement, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 333 (1954).
3 REv. STAT. § 3648 (1873), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 529 (1952) as follows:
"No advance of public money shall be made in any case unless authorized
by the appropriation concerned or other law. And in all cases of contracts
for the performance of any service, or for the delivery of articles
of any description, for the use of the United States, payment shall not
exceed the value of the service rendered, or of the articles delivered
previously to such payment. It shall, however, be lawful, under the special
direction of the President, to make such advances to the disbirsing officers
of the Government as may be necessary to the faithful and prompt discharge of their respective duties, and to the fulfillment of the public
engagements. The President may also direct such advances as he may
deem necessary and proper to persons in the military and naval service
employed on distant stations, where the discharge of the pay and emoluments to which they may be entitled cannot be regularly effected."
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of the Government, somewhat prodded or encouraged by parts
of the legislative branch, have - except for one very brief
interlude 4 interrupted by pressures which apparently found no
courage to combat them - resorted to various tactics in their
efforts to increase the liberality of their administration by measures designed "to facilitate and accelerate" 5 such advances, or
'payments."
One tactic has been to attempt to achieve some dignity as
well as validity for the advances by having them associated
with the President's Cabinet Committee on Small Business
and approved by the Comptroller General of the United States.
Fairly recently, the tacticians were able to secure a White
House press release to announce the issuance of a new administrative regulation on the subject of advances in the form of
progress payments. The regulation furnishes what purports to
be a definition of progress payments and stipulates certain
general conditions under which they are to be made. What it
fails to state, however, is any authority for permitting such
advances of public moneys in the form of progress payments.
Yet, the regulation "prescribes basic policies and procedures
governing executive agencies in making partial payments and in
providing contract financing in the form of progress payments."
As such, without reference to any authority and without any
authority in fact, it is shocking, to say the least, that it not only
was issued but still allowed to exist. Certain earlier regulations
on the subject of progress payments by another executive
agency, disclose a similar unconcern for the lack of any authority for making progress payments. Everybody, including the
President's Cabinet Committee on Small Business, appears to
be taking it for granted that progress paymenst may be made
at any time desired and that they should be made as soon as
possible upon the receipt of an appropriate request.
The situation is but one of a number in which the processes of
administrative interpretation, as implemented and projected by
administrative regulations, have been allowed to proceed without
challenge in the public interest to the point that the interpretation has become an interpolation and certain basic laws designed
as safeguards of the public purse have been compromised
to practical extinction, usually on the basis of some vague
4 Hearings,supra note 2, at 331-33.
5 Department of Defense Directive No. 7800.4, 1 CCH Gov'T CONTRACTS REP.

23,126 (1) (1956).
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theories of expediency. While the quotation at the beginning of
this article is from a statement made at a time when the Congress
was studying an exception to the statute now under consideration, it seems certain from the full text of the source that neither
the speaker nor others present fully realized that it could be
as extremely prophetic as it may then have appeared dogmatic.
The Congress of the United States has consciously permitted
comparatively few broad exceptions to the statutory prohibition
against the payment of public monies in advance of delivery
of goods or services. Those exceptions have been accomplished
by duly enacted legislation. However, since that same branch
of the Government apparently has unconsciously 6 permitted
various agencies of the Government to make predelivery (progress) payments without the enactment of any legislation, the
Defense Department has for a number of years assumed the
authority to do for the Army and the Air Force, what Congress
has found necessary to do by legislation, for the Navy, and
earlier for the Treasury Department, to permit payments from
public funds to be made in advance of delivery to the Government if a superior lien on the goods is obtained. Executive agencies have become so encouraged by the fact that the legislative
branch continues to appear completely oblivious to the utter
illegality of the Defense Department procedure that invitations
to bid have been issued in which prospective bidders have been
invited to choose between post-delivery and predelivery payments. And most recently all Government agencies have been
issued regulations which require them to invite requests for
progress payments in issuing invitations for bids.
It is hardly likely that the important significance of existing
serious conflicts between executive regulations and certain
6 One writer has stated 'that the enactment of 55 -STAT. 147 (1941), 40
U.S.C. § 270 (e) (1952), waiving the performance bond requirement in certain
types of contracts, seems to indicate congressional approval of the known practice
of making progress payments in return for title to the work in progress. Whelan,
Government Supply Contracts: Progress Payments Based on Costs; The New Defense
Regulations, 26 FoRDHAm L. REv. 224, 231-32 n.33 (1957). However, the writer
appears to have overlooked the fact that eight months later, when Congress enacted
the First War Powers Act, 55 STAT. 839 (1941) (later amended by 64 STAT. 1257
(1951), later amended by 50 U.S.C. App. § 611 (1952)), it considered it necessary
to include progress payments, to avoid the prohibition of REV. STAT. § 3648 (1873),
as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 529 (1952). Therefore, if the legislative branch knew
of the decisions and opinions, to which the writer refers, or is chargeable with the
knowledge of them, its enactment of the First War Powers Act demonstrated that
they were not considered as establishing any lawful means of circumventing the
prohibition of the statute, such as by attempting to equate lien of title to delivery
required by the statute. The legislative branch demonstrated the fact again when it
enacted 60 STAT. 809 (1946), 31 U.S.C. § 529 (1952). See p. 386 .infra.
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statutory laws is known by many, including the Congress and
high executive officials as well as the general public, most of
whom are bewildered as well as shocked by the current indications that substantially greater sums must be spent than the
staggering amounts previously spent and being spent for defense, to overtake and surpass certain scientific achievements
of our competitors. Some who are or may become familiar
with the significance of those conflicts may not find them particularly palatable to acknowledge, for political or other reasons,7
especially if they happened to be among those who are responsible for creating and perpetuating the existing conflicts. The
cost of the facade which perpetuates errors to save the face of
those responsible in both the executive and legislative branches
of the Government is not limited to the statute involved in this
article. 8 And it appears that the longer the facade is allowed to
remain the more ingrained becomes the obsession that the
facade must be maintained at any cost to protect the everincreasing number of those who, wittingly or unwittingly, have
participated in building the facade. Since the structure seriously
affects vital parts of the national economy and security, it may
well be that an appropriate appointment of one with czaristic
powers is the only solution.
I.

THE BACKGROUND AND PROGRESS OF
SECTION 3648, REVISED STATUTES

Section 3648 was derived from an act of January 31, 1823,1
and its language' ° is substantially the same as that contained
in the 1823 act. Its progress has been like that of many statutes
which were intended to protect the public interest in the use of
its funds. It has failed in great measure to accomplish the pro7 For example, the Small Business Administration appears to take pride in
its part in establishing a policy designed to facilitate and accelerate the making
of progress payments, Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Small
Business, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1957); but is is doubtful whether the Administrator, who expressed that pride, was aware that no authority then existed (or
now exists) for the payments to which he referred.
8 REv. STAT. § 3678 (1873), as amended 31 U.S.C. § 628 (1952) is another
good illustration. See McClelland, The ProposalFor a Work Suspension or Govern-

ment Delay Clause, 18 U. PrrT. L. Rav. 754 (1957). Title II of the First War Powers
Act, 55 STAT. 839 (1941), as amended 64 STAT. 1257 (1951), as amended 50 U.S.C.
A, . § 611 (1952), is another, McClelland, The Administration of Title II of the
First War Powers Act, 61 Dicy L. REv. 215, 226-29 (1957).
9 3 STAT. 723, (later revised by Rev. STAT. § 3648 (1873), as amended, 31
U.S.C. § 529 (1952).
10 As will be seen, the important language, which makes the statutory prohibition unequivocal, has remained intact and unaffected in meaning by any later
expressions of Congress in that respect.
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tection intended because the Government has no advocacy
appropriate to compel an accounting by those who long have
violated, and continue to violate, such statutes."' An examination of the advancement of section 3648 will show that neither
the Congress nor the President intend that it is to be avoided
without appropriate legislation. Nevertheless, executive agencies
have proceeded to use tremendous amounts of public funds 2
in making progress payments in complete disregard of that fact.
The act of January 31, 1823 provides in pertinent part, as
follows:
That, from and after the passing of this act, no advance of
public money shall be made in any case whatever; but in all
cases of contracts for the performance of any service, or the
delivery of articles of any description, for the use of the United
States, payment shall not exceed the value of the service rendered, or of the articles delivered previously to such payment:
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That every officer or agent
of the United States, who shall offend against the provisions
of the preceding sections, shall, by the officer charged with the
direction of the department to which .such offending officer
is responsible, be promptly reported to the President of the
United States, and dismissed from the public service: Provided,
That in all cases, where any officer, in default as aforesaid, shall
account to the satisfaction of the President for such default,
he may be continued in office, any thing in the foregoing provision to the contrary notwithstanding.' 3

It is important especially to observe that the language of
the statute specifically makes the prohibition against the advance of public money applicable "in-any case.' 1 4 As stated
many years ago by the Court of Claims, it would be almost
impossible to frame more general, sweeping, or stronger prohibitions than this statute contains. Both the penalty and the
11 Cf. McClelland, The Proposal For a Work Suspension or Government Delay
Clause, 18 U. PrrT. L. REv. 754, 754-61 (1957); McClelland,'GovernmentAdvocacy
as Related to Appeal Procedures Unaccomplished Since the Wunderlich Legislation, 25 FOROHAM L. REV. 593, 597-600 (1957).
12 Over $4 billion outstanding at years' end for two successive years. Hearings
Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, on Participation of Small Business in Military Procurement, 84th Cong., Ist.Sess. 257 (1955);
HearingsBefore a Subcommittee of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business,*
on Small Business Policies and Programs,84th Cong., 2d Sess. 366 (1956). At least
a substantial portion of the sum involved appears to have been advanced without
authority.
13 Act of Jan. 31, 182-3, c. 9, 3 STAT. 723, (later revised by REv. STAT. § 3648
(1873), as amended 31 U.S.C. § 529 (1952-))..
14 ."In any case" would seem as unequivocal.as "in any. case whatever" as. the
statute read before codification.
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prohibition are "in plain and distinct terms."15 Nevertheless,
and in seeming contempt for its exceptionally plain language,
as will later be shown in this article, the statute has been subjected to extreme interpolation.' 6 The anomalous aspects of
the situation become more apparent upon an examination of
the progress of the statute. Since it was enacted in 1823, a
number of statutory modifications of the law against advances
have been accomplished, but usually for limited periods only. 1 7
By an act of August 2, 1946,18 the first sentence of section
3648 was amended to read: "No advance of public money
shall be made in any case unless authorized by the appropriation
concerned or other law.""' The reason for the amendment is
explained in the legislative history:
The advance of public money generally is prohibited by section
3648, Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 529). Occasionally, to meet
special needs and particular situations (especially in the case
of transactions abroad) it has been found necessary to create

15
Peirce v. United States, I Ct. Cl. 270, 285-86 (1865), aft'd sub. non. The
Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666 (1868).
16 See pp. 390-98 infra.
17 28 STAT. 582 (1894) (repealed, 55 STAT. 585 (1941), 31 U.S.C. § 542 (1952)
(Treasury Department); 37 STAT. 32 (1911), 34 U.S.C. § 582 (1952) (as revised,
70A STAT. 464 (1956), 10 U.S.C. § 7521 (Supp. 1957)) (Navy Department); Act of
Oct. 6, 1917, c. 79, § 5, 40 STAT. 383 (Secretaries of War and Navy Departments
during World War I); Act of June 28, 1940, c. 440, 54 STAT. 676 (Secretary of
the Navy and Secretary of the Treasury during national emergency declared Sept. 8,
1939); Act of July 2, 1940, c. 508, 54 STAT. 712 (Secretary of War, in interest of
national defense); Act of Feb. 6, 1941, c. 5, § 2, 55 STAT. 6 (Maritime Commission);
Act of Dec. 18, 1941, c. 593, § 201, 55 STAT. 839 (the President, whenever he determined that such action would faciliate the prosecution of the war); 64 STAT. 1257
(1951), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 611 (1952) (the President to facilitate the national defense).
In Feb. 1951, the Under Secretary of the Army in concert with the Procurement
Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force, and approved by the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, issued regulations, 16 FED. REo. 2623 (1951), which excluded the
use of progress payments from those actions to be exercised under the statute involved, 1A CCH GoV'T CONTRACTS REP. 24,805 (1956); 1 CCH GoV'T CONTRACTS
REP. [21,752-53, 753 (1956), and the incumbent President has never made any determination under the pertinent part of the statute, McClelland, The Administration of
Title 11 of the First War Powers Act, 61 DIcK L. Rav. 215, 226-29 (1957)); 60
STAT. 780 (1946) (repealed, 70A STAT. 675 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 475 (Supp. 1957))
(Navy Department for research and development); Act of July 13, 1955, c. 358,
69 STAT. 301 (Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1956).

18

60 STAT. 809, 31 U.S.C. § 529 (1952).

19 As to the amendment, the Comptroller General reported that:
"[N]o objection appears to the apparent purpose of the proposed amendment, which
is to lay the foundation for particular exceptions from time to time to be contained
in appropriation bills and not to be subject to point of order." Comp. GEN. REPORT
ON A BILL TO AuTHORiZ
CERTAIN ADMINIsTRATIVE ExPENSEs,
Committee Print,
House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
8 (1946). It is to be noted that the Comptroller General's report would indicate that
he did not intend to extend the application of the decisions of his office on section
3648 to the extent to which the Defense Department has.
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legislative exceptions to the general rule. These situations are

comparatively minor but are apt to require quick legislative
action. Section 11 would amend the original section merely by
adding the words "unless authorized by the appropriation concerned or other law". Its purpose is merely to sanction the
incorporation of exceptions in appropriation acts as may be
required from 20time to time without raising the question of a
point of order.

The reader will note from this legislative history that in 1946,
Congress showed no indication of approving or recognizing the
interpolation of section 3648 referred to in this article 21 with
respect to the executive agencies' broad application of a Comptroller General's decision. Instead, Congress appears to be in
full accord with the statement many years ago by the Court of
Claims that the prohibition of the statute is "in plain and distinct terms.''22 Congress makes it clear that where the statutory
prohibition against the advancement of public funds in any
case is to be avoided, "it has been found necessary to create
legislative exceptions to the general rule," which is vastly different from what the executive agencies have been doing for years.
In the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947,23 Congress
approved a provision which subject to certain stipulated conditions, permits the agency head to make advance payments,
under negotiated contracts, in any amount not exceeding the
contract price. At that time, the Secretary of War furnished the
Speaker of the House of Representatives an analysis of them in
which he referred to the act of June 28, 1940,24 and the War
Powers Act2 5 and stated that the experience gained under that
emergency legislation had shown that a return to "the strict
principle set forth in section 3648, Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C.
529) wherein advances of public money are forbidden in all
cases," is undesirable. 26 Despite that official recognition of the
strict limitations of section 3648 and of the necessity of obtaining legislation to circumvent those limitations, the actual practice for many years since that time in the Department involved
20 H.R. REP. No. 2186, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1946); S. REP. No. 1636, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1946).
21 See pp. 397-405 infra.
22 See note 15 supra.
23 62 STAT. 21 (1948), 41 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154 (a) (1952), as superseded by
10 U.S.C. 2307" (a) (Supp. 1957). Also see § 305 of the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949, 63 STAT. 396, 41 U.S.C. § 255 (1952).
24 Act of June 28, 1940, c. 440, 54 STAT. 676.
25 Act of Dec. 18, 1941, § 201, 55 STAT. 839. (This Act was extended and
amended by 64 STAT. 1257 (1951), 50 U.S.C. APP. 611 (1952)).
26 H.R. REP.No. 109, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1947).
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seems to conflict with such recognition insofar as progress payments are concerned. The 1947 act contains no provision permitting such payments. It is shown in the pages which follow.
that therefore the Defense Department must have decided that
it would rely on certain broad language used by the Comptroller
General, in a case involving very special facts, to take the place
of the legislative sanction considered by the Army Secretary
and by Congress as necessary to avoid the limitations of 3648.7
Without regard to the fact that the chronological progress of
the statute prohibiting an advance of public funds discloses that,
with the exception of the Navy under the act of 1911,28 the
Defense Department has had no authority to make progress
payments in circumvention of section 3648 since at least June
30, 1953, when the War Powers Act became ineffective, 29 a recent article by the Chairman of the Contract Finance Committee,
Department of Defense, stated that progress payments are the
largest single segment of contract financing in that Department. °
The text of the article contains no discussion of the authority
relied upon and the text of an earlier article3l by the same writer
merely refers to title II of the First War Powers Act as "other
authority" for progress payments. Accordingly, the desirability
of determining specifically what accounts for the Defense Department's long-standing violations of the statute seems obvious.
II.

EVIDENCE OF OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY

One of the ironies of the situation with respect to the authority relied upon by the executive agencies in making advances
of public funds in defiance of the statutory prohibition is its
complete absence from the most publicized pertinent regulations
of those agencies and the necessity of examining the law reviews
to learn the facts. In the absence of any guidance in their current regulations3" as to authority for progress payments, it is
27 Hearings on H.R. 9822 to Expedite Naval Shipbuilding, House Connittee
on Naval Aflairs, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 3170 (1940).
28 37 STAT. 32 (1911), 34 U.S.C. § 582 (1952) (as revised 70A STAT. 464
(1956), 10 U.S.C. § 7521 (Supp. 1957)).
"9
McClelland, The Administration of Title II of the First War Powers Act,
61 DICK. L. Rnv. 215, 226-29 (1957).
30 Bachman, Defense Department Contract Financing, 25 GEo. WVAsH. L. REv.
228, 229 (1957).
31 Bachman and Lanman, Defense Contract Financing, 12 FED. B.J. 287,
288 (1952).
32 C.F.R. §§ 82.1-82.74 (1947); General Services Administration Personal
Property Management Regulation No. 33, 1A CCH Gov'T CONTRcrs REP. 24,875
(1956).
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to be hoped that the agencies are as liberal in making those reviews available for the use of their contracting officers and
finance officers as they are in making advances of public funds
in the form of progress payments. While the text of the recent
article by the Contract Finance Committee Chairman contains
no discussion of the authority relied upon in making progress
payments, a footnote citation to the statute prohibiting such
payments is followed by a quotation from a decision by the
3
Comptroller General. 3
While, under the prohibition of the statute, payment may
not be made for articles in which the United States has acquired
no right or interest and from which it derives no benefit, pay-

ment may be made for articles in advance of their delivery into
the' actual possession of the United States if title therein has
vested in the Government at the time of such payment, or if
the articles are impressed with a valid lien in favor of the
United States in an amount at least equal to the payment.

The footnote also refers to 1 Comp. Gen. 143 (1921); 28
Comp. Dec. 468 (1949); and title H of the First War Powers
Act and the implementing executive order of 1951. The writer
of the article used the same references in his earlier article
written in 1952.34 Without any indication as to authority in the
current regulations, and in view of the official position of the
writer of the articles, the reader has no choice but to conclude
that the footnote references represent the authorities relied upon
by the Defense Department - and apparently by other executive agencies as well - in making progress payments. In the
earlier article, as heretofore stated, the writer merely refers to
title IIof the First War Powers Act as "other authority"8 5 for
progress payments. Actually, title H when properly implemented
by a determination by the President8 6 is the only general statutory
or other authority that ever existed to disregard the long-standing
statutory prohibition against the advance of public money in any
case.8 7 One writer has questioned the existence of any authority
to make progress payments when the First War Powers Act was
in effect.38 However, the Defense Department very recently con20 CoMP. GEN. 917, 918 (1941).
See note 31 supra.
35 Ibid.
36 See note 29 supra.
37 Act of Jan. 31, 1823, c. 9, 3 STAT. 723 (later revised by REv. STAT. § 3648
(1873), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 529 (1952)).
38 Pasley. The Interpretation of Government Contracts: A Plea For Better
Understanding,25 FoRDHAM L. REV. 211, 234-35 (1946).
33

34
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firmed the distinct impression that the emphasis the Defense
Department writer gives to the Comptroller General's decision
impels the conviction that the Department has been using and
will continue to use those decisions as complete authority for
advancing public funds in any case notwithstanding the specific
prohibition to the contrary and the fact that Congress has always considered the enactment of legislation necessary to avoid
the prohibition of the statute. In a letter of August 27, 1957,11
the Department's General Counsel assured Senator Easfland of
the Senate Judiciary Committee that if title II were extended for
another year, the Department would not use it for "authorizing
the making of any progress payment" and added:
I am sure you understand that in making the above undertakings we do not mean to indicate that the Department of
Defense has in fact been following these practices, but we
understand the desire of your committee to have these positive
assurances.

Thus, it would appear from that letter that the Department of
Defense is officially acknowledging that it has not been using
and will not use title II because it has other authority which
permits it to avoid section 3648 whenever it wishes to make
a progress payment. That other authority clearly appears to be
based entirely upon the Defense Department's construction of
the decisions of the Comptroller General as authorizing an advance of public funds in any case, despite the statutory prohibition, if the Government has title in or a valid lien on the subject
matter involved, in an amount equal to the advance. It is this
writer's conviction that an examination of the facts and the
prior cases on which the Comptroller General's decisions are
based compels the conclusion that they must be strictly limited
to the cases before the Comptroller at the time the decisions
were rendered and that to consider them otherwise is to nullify
completely the statutory prohibition against the advancement
of public funds. Such an effect is what the executive agencies
have produced by what appears to be an indiscrirmiate application of the decisions in question. In such circumstances, an
analysis of those decisions is believed to be required.
III.

THE SECURITY STEEL CASE

This case 40 appears to be the principal one upon which the
executive agencies, particularly the Defense Department, rely
39

S. REP. No. 1152, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1957).

40

20 CoMP. GEN. 917 (1941).
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in advancing public funds in the form of progress payments. In
that case, the contractor was ready and willing to make delivery
of certain steel document file equipment but was compelled to
hold it for many months due to the continued inability of the
Navy Department to arrange for the space necessary to receive
the equipment. The contractor was working on borrowed capital,
and funds for labor and material had been tied up for many
months. Accordingly, the Department sought approval of a
contract modification authorizing a payment of ninety per cent of
the contract price on condition that the contractor furnish a bond
in the amount of the payment to guarantee faithful performance
of all of the obligations of the contract.
The Comptroller General approved the proposed modification and payment, provided the surety on the contractor's performance bond would consent and that the modification contain
language definitely providing that the contractor should be
responsible absolutely, and not as a mere bailee, for the care and
protection of the Government's equipment. Before stating his
approval of the proposed modification, the Comptroller General
expressed the view that while, under the prohibition of the statute, payment may not be made for articles in which the United
States has acquired no right or interest and from which it derives
no benefit, payment may be made for articles in advance of their
delivery into the actual possession of the United States if title
therein has vested in the Government at the time of such payment, or if the articles are impressed with a valid lien in favor
of the United States in an amount at least equal to the payment.
The Comptroller General cited three sources in support of his
view." Before examining those decisions it is important to
observe certain mitigating facts in the Security Steel case, since
it is obvious that some executive agencies, including the Defense
Department, are using it as authority to make progress payments
in any case. The facts in the case which should be carefully
considered are the Government's long inability to take delivery
and the bond which guaranteed the care and protection of the
equipment while in possession of the contractor as well as its
eventual delivery to the Government. When the Government unjustifiably prevents the delivery that section 3648 requires for
payment, the contractor should not be penalized by denial of
payment and if the Government secures a bond guaranteeing
41 1 COMP. GEN. 143 (1921), 17 COMP. DEC. 894 (1911), and 29 Ops. ATr'y
GEN. 46 (1911).
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delivery, the public funds paid out in advance of delivery, contrary to the statute, are recoverable under the bond in the
event of default. Thus, the broad language used by the Comptroller General in the Security Steel case in describing the circumstances for making payment in advance of delivery does not
seem required by the facts presented and clearly is not for
general application by reason of the plain language of the
statute which prohibits such advances "in any case."
It appears clear from the facts of the Security Steel case that
it should not be cited as authority for progress payments. Therefore, those executive agencies relying on that case for authority
are in constant violation of section 3648, and should be held
fully accountable and required to furnish a complete explanation of their position, pursuant to the penalty provisions of the
original statute.
The Army's View of the Security Steel Case
as Disclosed by Its Published Regulations
The Army regulations pertaining to the making of payments
by finance officers show that for approximately eleven years
after its publication the Army, officially at least, appeared to
disclose no use of the Security Steel case, in other cases, to
circumvent the statutory prohibition against the advancement
of public funds.
On March 15, 1939, the regulation as to when contract
payments may be made referred to section 3648, Revised
Statutes, (31 U.S.C. 529), as prohibiting payments in advance
of the delivery of supplies or rendition of service, except as
otherwise provided by law.42 On June 12, 1942, or approximately one year after the Security Steel case, the regulation was
stated in the same language but listed two exceptions provided
by law.43 One referred to section 1 (c) of the act of July 2,
1940, authorizing the Secretary of War to advance payments
to contractors for supplies or construction for the War Department in amounts not exceeding thirty per centum of the contract price, whenever, prior to July 1, 1942, the Secretary
deemed it necessary in the interest of the national defense. 44 The
other exception referred to title II of the First War Powers Act
permitting the President to authorize any department or agency
42
43

44

Army Reg. 35-6040, March 15, 1939.
Army Reg. 35-6040, June 12, 1942.
54 STAT. 712 (1940).
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of the Government, exercising functions in connection with the
prosecution of the war effort, to make advance, progress and
other payments without regard to the provisions of law relating
to the making, performance, amendment, or modfication of
contracts whenever he45deemed such action would facilitate the
prosecution of the war.
Under date of February 1, 1944, the regulation 6 remained
as it was stated on June 12, 1942, except that it contained a
reference to the necessary executive order implementing title II
of the First War Powers Act, which apparently was inadvertently
omitted from the prior statement of the regulation, since the act
itself, without such implementation, was no effective exception
to the prohibition on the War Department, as imposed by section
3648. Approximately six years after the Security Steel decision,
the statement of the regulation remained the same.47 In 1952 the
regulation was superseded by a new regulation 48 which contained
a statement with respect to the prohibition against advances of
public money, as provided in section 3648 of the Revised Statutes. Also, the new regulation changed the position of the words
"in advance of the delivery of supplies or rendition of service,"
substituted the more important words which actually follow in
the langauge of the statute, "in any case," and described what
previously had been called exceptions as "War emergency exceptions." However, in seeming tongue-in-cheek silent commentary on the new regulation's reference to the statutory prohibition as applicable "in any case," after several numbered paragraphs beyond the paragraph involving section 3648, the regulation for the first time incorporated a reference to the Security
Steel case, which had been of record for approximately eleven
years, as authorizing payment in advance for articles if title
therein has vested in the Government at the time of payment,
or if the articles are impressed with a valid lien in favor of the
49
United States in an amount at least equal to the payment.
No explanation has been found to account for the Department's sudden adoption of the Security Steel case as general
authority to make progress payments if the Government holds
title or a "valid lien" on the article involved. Nor is it clear why
reference to the case was not included in the paragraph of the
55 STAT. 839 (1941); 64 STAT. 1257 (1951), 50 U.S.C. App. 611 (1952).
46 See note 43 supra.
47 Army Reg. 35-6040, Feb. 18, 1947.
48 Army Reg. 35-3220, July 18, 1952.
49 Id. at 13.
45
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regulation specifically dealing with section 3648, rather than
placing it several paragraphs beyond. As the regulation was
stated at that time, and allowed to remain at least as late as
March 1958, its provision as to "When payment may be made"
appears misleading since ff the reader does not read other purportedly unrelated parts of the regulation, in addition to that
particular provision, he is led to believe that the Army does not
permit progress payments unless the case falls within the exceptions provided by law, such a title II of the First War Powers
Act. However, notwithstanding the Army regulation's misplaced
reference to the Security Steel case, it appears from the two law
review articles"o that what the Army officially refers to in its
published regulations as one of only two exceptions to the statutory prohibition against progress payments, as contained in
the First War Powers Act, is considered in actual administrative practice as another authority for such payments. The "other"
authority used is the Security Steel case, especially, and incidentally, certain other decisions on which that case is based. But
the facts involved in the other decisions are even more deficient
than the Security Steel case in furnishing any basis to authorize
progress payments in any case in which they might be requested.
IV. THE KERR CONSTRUCTION CASE
While it is true that in the Kerr Construction case, 51 in which
the Army was permitted to pay approximately $58,000 in advance of the completion of a trenching machine which the
Government was entitled to recapture for a total sum of only
$17,000, the Comptroller General quoted with approval the
holding in the Security Steel case, the facts showed, as in the
Security Steel case, that there was a surety bond to protect the
interest of the Government in the event that the contractor
should fail to clear the equipment of all liens and encumbrances
which might affect the title to be conveyed to the United States
at the time the partial payments were made. There is nothing in
the Kerr case which would warrant its use to justify progress
payments in any other case. And the Comptroller General's
reaffirmation of the Security Steel case gave the executive agencies no more authority to use it than was justified by the particular facts of the case at the time the case was decided.
?50 Bachman, Defense Department Contract Financing, 25 GEo. WASH. L. REv.

228 (1957); Bachman and Lanman, Defense Contract Financing, 12 FED. B. J. 287
(1952).
51 28 ComP. GEN. 468 (1948-49).
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V. THE CURTIS AEROPLANE CASE
The article by the Contract Finance Committee Chairman
refers to 1 Comp. Gen. 143, as one of the "other pertinent
decisions of the Comptroller General." In that case the contract
was with the Curtis Aeroplane and Motors Corporation and
covered the construction and delivery of fifty airplanes and
certain sets of spare parts. The first plane was to be delivered
within three months after the contractor's detail drawings of
necessary changes had been finally approved by the Government, and the remaining forty-nine were to be delivered within
twelve months after the delivery of the first plane. Most of the
payments were to be made in certain designated amounts at
various times to be determined by the amount of work and
materials on hand. The Comptroller General again cited three
decisions 52 as his authority for holding that the provisions of
section 3648 of the Revised Statutes do not necessarily preclude
the making of any payment under a contract until the entire
subject matter of the contract has been completed and turned
over to the Government. Its prime purpose, as stated in the
opinion, was to prevent the advancement to the contractor of
funds with which to enable him to perform his contract, and
not to prevent a partial payment in any case in which the amount
of such payment had been actually earned and the United States
had received an equivalent therefor.
The Comptroller General found that the amount of the proposed partial payment in each instance was well within the
amount actually expended by the contractor for work and
material to go into the performance of the contract. The Comptroller associated that finding with the fact that article VIII of
the contract expressly provided that title to all property on
which a partial payment is made should vest in the United
States forthwith upon the making of such partial payment.
Those facts, he held, fulfilled "the condition that the United
States must receive a corresponding benefit in order to justify
the making of a partial payment...."
While the Comptroller General appears to have construed
section 3648 very liberally in the Curtis Aeroplane case and he
does not confine the application of his decision to the facts of
the case before him, it is to be noted that the case was decided
in 1921, long before the 1939 statement of the Army regula52 18 Ops. ATT'Y. Gr-N. 105 (1885); 20 Ops. ATT'Y. GrN. 746 (1894)
CoMP. DEc. 894 (1911).

and 17
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tion' 3 on advances of public funds which makes no reference
to the decision, and long before the enactment of the First War
Powers Act of 1941,' 4 the first general statutory exception to the
basic prohibition of section 3648 against progress payments.
Thus Congress, as well as the Army, did not consider that the
decision in Curtis Aeroplane is for any general application
despite the language used and found it necessary to enact special
legislation to avoid the statutory prohibition. The President
made the necessary determination; and, unless the war emergency exception was applicable, the Army regulation continued
to require strict compliance with section 3648 until the 1952
edition. ' How the Defense Department justifies its broad use
of the Comptroller's decision in disregard of the views of the
President, the Congress, and the Army has not been determined.
An examination of the cases relied upon in Curtis indicates that
the Army used good judgment in confining its use of that case
to it alone, since the interpretation of section 3648 in the basic
decision referred to the Curtis case was declared in connection
with work done in the construction of ships for the Navy and a
surety bond guarantteed full completion of the contract including delivery and good workmanship.5 6 The application of that
See note 42 supra.
54 See note 45 supra.
55 See note 48 supra.
56 Delivery here was a necessary part of the "performance" guaranteed under
the bond. In the case cited from 17 COMP. DEc. 894 (1911), the question was
whether in the event of the repeal of the act of March 11, 1911, 37 STAT. 32, 34
U.S.C. § 582 (1952) (as revised 70A STAT. 464 (1956), 10 U.S.C. § 7521 (Supp.
1957)), the Navy Department would be prohibited from making any part payments
or whether the Department would be at liberty to make full part payments as
provided for in its contracts for the construction of naval vessels. The contracts
provided for a lien superior to all other liens.
The Comptroller referred to the opinion expressed approximately a month earlier
by the Attorney General on the same question, in which that official cited an opinion
of one of his predecessors, 18 OPs. A-r'Y. GEN. 105 (1885), handed down in a
case in which the Government had a lien on the ship for all payments made and
the contractor and his sureties guaranteed full completion and good workmanship.
There the Secretary of the Navy was advised that section 3648 does not preclude
a payment in any case where the money has been actually earned and the Government has received an equivalent therefor, stating that the object of the statute was
"to prevent payments being made to contractors in advance of the performance of
their contracts ..
" The Comptroller also reviewed another opinion, 20 Ops. ATT'Y.
GEN. 746 (1894), holding that no payment should be made unless the Government
becomes the owner of the work paid for and concluded that:
"The general rule would therefore seem to be well recognized that, in
the absence of statutory prohibition, partial payments may be made on
account of work done in the construction of vessels for the Navy if (1)
title to the vessel shall have passed to the United States at the time of
such payments or (2) a lien shall have been created by law or contract
upon the unfinished vessel to the amount of such partial payments."
53
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interpretation to the facts in the Curtis case, which disclose no
surety to guarantee the delivery required by section 3648, appears clearly in error on the basis of the facts as well as the
law which precludes advances of public funds in any case.
The False Hypothesis of the Security Steel Case Rule
The weakness of the equation underlying the procedure of the
executive agencies of the Government in making progress payments in contravention of the specific statutory prohibition of
section 3648, on the basis of decisions in which title or a paramount lien in the Government is equated to the delivery to the
Govenment required by the statute, is shown by the patent conflict in certain language which those agencies advance as reconcilable:
[P]ayment may be made in
advance of delivery if title or
a valid lien is held by the
United States. 57

No advance of public money
shall be made in any case.
. . .And in all cases of contracts . . .payment shall not
exceed the value of . . .the
5
.
articles delivered.
(Emphasis added).

The only explanation by the proponents of the equation is the
language of the much earlier decision which stated that section
3648 does not preclude a payment in any case where the money
has been actually earned and the Government has received an
equivalent therefore, "its object being to prevent payments
being made to contractors in advance of the performance of
their contracts. . ...
" But delivery of the end product is the
performance for which the Government obligates itself to pay
out public funds to the contractor.6" It is not something short
of that, such as title to a collection of miscellany comprising
inventories of materials, parts, and work in process acquired or
produced by the contractor and allocated to the contract. 61
On that basis the Comptroller advised the Navy that repeal of the 1911 act would not
prohibit partial payments. It is to be noted that in predicating such a holding on
"the absence of statutory prohibition," in a case involving a clear statutory prohibition against what was approved in the decision, the Comptroller is saying that
there must be some other statute to prohibit that which was clearly prohibited in
the statute before him.
57 20 COMP. GEN. 917 (1941).
58 REv. STAT. § 3648 (1873), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 529 (1952).
59 18 Ops. ATr'v. GEN. 105 (1885).
60 This is not to overlook contracts providing for divisible or installment
deliveries.
61 1 CCH GOV'T CONTRucTs REP. 23,080 (d) (1956). The pertinent General
Services Administration regulation, General Services Administration Personal Property

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Vol.

XXnlI

Contractor activity which does not extend beyond the collection stage is not such a contract performance as to impose any
obligation, or authority, on the Governments' part to furnish
public funds to the contractor; and, if he fails to perform as he
is obligated, his right to proceed is, of course, eventually subject
to termination for default.12 Accordingly, since the object of
the statute, as described in the earlier decision, is not fulfilled,
the explanation relied upon by those who initiated and by those
who have utilized the equation completely fails to justify it.
It is as indefensible as the language of the basic decision which
purports to jutify an exception 63 to a statute which contains
specific language expressly precluding any exception. 64
In short, the fact that the Government proceeds to take a
paramount lien or title when it issues a progress payment accomplishes nothing in the way of avoiding the plain prohibition
of section 3648. It is nothing but an exercise of ordinary business acumen, the least that could be expected where money is
paid out for nothing tangible in hand, and clearly not overlooked
by the legislative branch of the Government when it deemed
it necessary to prohibit the advance of public funds in any
case. Nevertheless, the significance of the transaction has been
so inflated by those who have flouted section 3648 that they
would have it recognized, without question, as an equivalent
of delivery.
VI.

THE JOINT REGULATION AS ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OF
OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY

While there is no authority permitting the Army or any of
the other executive agencies 5 to make progress payments otherwise as stated in the specific paragraph on that subject in the
pertinent Army regulation,6 6 it appears that at the time of the
Management Regulation No. 33, 1A CCH Gov'T CONTRACTS REP. (1956), purports
to demonstrate such certainty that the title acquired "fully" protects the interests
of the Government so that only "unusual cases" are deemed to require performance
bonds. Yet the principal decisions relied up to avoid section 3648 involved performance bonds, 20 CoMP. GEN. 917 (1941); 17 CoMP. DcC. 894 (1911); 18 Ops.
ATr'v. GEN. 105 (1885).
62
1 CCH GOV'T CONTRACTS RaP. 18,202 (1953) and f18,305 (5) and (11)
(1950).
20 COMP. GEN. 917 (1941).
63 "[If title . . . or a valid lien.
64 The 1946 amendment to the statute, page 386, supra, still left the statute
barring any exception for all practical purposes since "other law" is vastly different
than executive exceptions attempted by executive interpolations of the statute.
65 With the exception of the Navy Deprtment, 37 STAT. 32 (1911), 34 U.S.C.
582 (1952), 10 U.S.C. 7531 (Rev. 1956).
66 Army Reg. 35-3220, July 18, 1952.
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1952 edition of that regulation there was a Joint Regulation of
the three Armed Services, issued four months earlier, covering the
subject of contract financing and superseding all previous regulations inconsistent therewith.17 The regulation states that the
basic policies set forth in the regulation apply to guaranteed
loans, advance payments, and "in the case of progress payments
to the extent relevant," and that regulations are in the course
of development concerning progress payments. Approximately
ten years had passed since progress payments had been authorized by the War Powers Act 6 8 and yet no regulations had been
fully developed to administer such payments. What portion of
the Joint Regulation of 1952 was to be used for progress payments was left indefinite by the use of the equivocal language,
"to the extent relevant." Two years later, or twelve years after
the War Powers Act, the regulations were still in course of
development. 69
The Joint Regulation specifically refers to the First War
Powers Act and the implementing executive order"° as authority
to make advance payments 71 on all contracts. Since the act and
the order are equally applicable to progresspayments, the failure
of the regulation to include a similar reference in its provision
for progress payments leaves the distinct impression that the
Armed Services concluded that they have such other authority
for progress payments as to make it unnecessary for them to use
73
72
the War Powers Act for that purpose. The law review articles
leave no doubt that it is the official position of the Armed
Services that the decisions of the Comptroller General make it
67 Joint Regulations of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air
Force, 1 CCH Gov'T CONTRACTS REP. 23,000-01 (1952).
68 Act of Dec. 18, 1941, § 201, 55 STAT. 839. (This act was extended and
amended 64 STAT. 1257 (1951), 50 U.S.C. App. 611 (1952). However, the Defense
Department suspended its use of the statute to justify progress payments pending
the issuance of supplemental regulations. 1A CCH Gov'T CONTRACTs REP. 24805
(1956); 1 CCH GOV'T CONTRACTS RaP. 21752-53 (1952).
69 DEP'T DEFENSE Dim. No. 7840.1 (1954); Hearings before a Subcommittee
of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, on Participationof Small Business
in Military Procurement, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 327-28 (1954).
70 Joint Regulations of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air
Force, 1 CCH GoV'T CONTRACTs REp. 23,000 (1952).
71 Advance payments are considered as loans to the contractor prior to and in
anticipation of complete performance of a contract. 1 CCH Gov'T CoNTRACTS REP.
10,411 (1952). Actually, they precede little, if any, significant performance, whereas
progress payments, or partial payments as they are sometimes called, should follow
some measurable performance pursuant to the contract.
72 The Defense Department's letter of Aug. 27, 1957, to Senator Eastland
seems to confirm this impression. 103 CONG. Rac. 15062, 15064 (1957). Also, see
the suspension of progress payments pursuant to the War Powers Act, IA CCH
Gov'T CONTRACTS REP. 24,805 (1956); 1 CCH GOV'T CONTRACTS REP. 21,752-53
(1952).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Vol. XXXIII

unnecessary to rely upon the War Powers Act to make progress
payments. The Joint Regulation makes no reference to the
Comptroller General's decisions on the subject of progress
payments and provides that "the authority to make progress
payments is subject to the provisions of section 3648, Revised
Statutes .. .," (emphasis added) but does not state the authority
relied upon which it considers subject to those provisions."4
Approximately four years after the first Joint Regulation, the
Armed Services appear to have become so encouraged in finding
that they could proceed to make progress payments without
reference to their authority - and without any authority in fact
since at least June 30, 195375 - that they issued a new Joint
Regulation in December 195676 in which they still failed to cite
any authority even though, as previously, they provided a paragraph with a title designed to show the authority involved. As
in 1952, the Armed Services state that "the authority" is subject
to section 3648 but they fail to identify the authority which is
subject to that section.
The anomaly in the situation which involves a persistent violation of a clear statutory prohibition, and many procedural
directives 77 issued as though no such prohibition exists, is
perhaps equalled only by the fact that comprehensive regulations on the matter which in 1952 had been evolving for ten
years, and continuing in that status in 1954, never reached a
completed form until the Joint Regulation of December 1956.78
VII.

THE

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION REGULATION
ON PROGRESS PAYMENTS
9 on

Two weeks after the issuance of the Joint Regulation
progress payments, requiring its observance by all Armed Services, the General Services Administration issued a regulation8"
72 Bachman, Defense Department Contract Financing,25 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
228, 229 (1957); Bachman and Lanman, Defense Contract Financing, 12 FED. B.J.
287, 288 (1952).
74 Joint Regulations of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the
Air Force, 1 CCH GOV'T CONTRACTS REP. f23,008 (1952).
75 McClelland, The Administration of Title 11 of the First War Powers Act, 61
DICK. L. REV. 215, 226-29 (1957).
76 1 CCH GOV'T CONTRACTS REP. 23,000 (1956).
77 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Select Committee on Small
Business, on Participation of Small Business in Military Procurement, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 476-99 (1954).
78 See note 76 supra.
79 Ibid.
80 General Services Administration Personal Property Management Regulation
No. 33, IA CCH GOV'T CONTRACTS REP. 24,875 (1956).
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on the same subject, governing all agencies, including the Armed
Services, and said to have been developed co-operatively with
the Department of Defense and to have been issued with the
approval of the Comptroller General of the United States. It
prescribes:
...

basic policies and procedures governing executive agencies

in making partial payments and in providing contract financing
in the form of progress payments, in consonance with Recommendation 6 of the First Progress Report of the Cabinet Committee on Small Business.

The regulation defines the term "progress payments" as
follows:
[P]ayments made from time to time during the performance

of a contract on the basis of costs to the contractor, or percentage of completion or particular stage of completion, in connection with which the Government takes title to property acquired
and work performed under the contract.

The GSA statement of the "basis" on which such payments are
made follows substantially that used in the Joint Regulation of
the three Armed Services. But also, like that regulation, it is
most inaccurate and misleading in that it fails to state the most
important fact; that they are payments made prior to delivery,
in direct contravention of the specific statutory prohibition of
section 3648.1 That weakness may be explained by another
weakness which makes the whole regulation questionable on
its face - the omission of any statement of authority to make
payments prior to delivery. The Armed Services Joint Regulation paid lip-service, at least, to well established administrative
procedure by providing space and a title designation with respect to authority, even though it cited none, whereas GSA appears to have decided to omit any reference to authority since
no authority exists in fact and since the practice of making
progress payments has so long been indulged in without authority. A complete disregard for the lack of authority to make
progress payments seems manifest in approximately four pages
of the regulation devoted to provisions requiring bid invitations
to offer progress payments to bidders.
It is stated in paragraph 8 (b) of the regulation that in addition to the protection afforded by careful exercise of judgment
81 31 U.S.C. § 529 (1952). Progress payments were defined as "predelivery
payments" by the Chairman of the Contract Finance Committee, Department of
Defense, see note 74 supra at 326, and as payments "before delivery" by the Department of the Army in Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Select Com,nittee on Small Business, on Participation of Small Business in Military Procurement,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 300 (1956).
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in determining bidders' responsibility as well as careful administration of the contract, the suggested title clause should be sufficient, except in unusual circumstances, to fully protect the
Government's interests.8 2 In this manner, the regulation conveniently ignores the fact that the existing law makes it clear that
the required protection of the Government's interest is delivery
as provided in the contract.8 Appropriate advocacy of the
Government's interests would compel GSA to show its authority
for subjecting public funds to progress payments and precisely
how it has determined that acquisition of title in the miscellany
involved should be sufficient "to fully protect the Government's
interests," absent unusual circumstances, so long as it is implemented "by careful exercise of judgment in determining bidders'
responsibility as well as careful contract administration. ' 84 The
suggested title clause declares title to be vested in the Government with respect to property "theretofore acquired or produced by the Contractor and allocated or properly chargeable"
to the contract, but the regulation fails to disclose how title is
acquired as to any such property in which a third party actually
has a prior title or a prior valid lien of record.8" What actual
title, if any, may have existed in the miscellaneous assortment
of property referred to in the title clause of the contract can
substantially disappear by the contractor's disposition of that
property and the substitution of a mere "credit memorandum"
for it.8 6 The regulation requires only that the progress payments
are "fairly" supported by the "value" of work actually accomplished on the undelivered portion of the contract.8 7 And unless
82
General Services Administration Personal Property Management Regulation
No. 33, 1A CCH Gov'T Co1rrnAcrs REP. 24,875, 8(b) (1956).
83 "[P]ayment shall not exceed the value . . . of the articles delivered previously to such payment.
Rav. STAT. § 3648 (1873), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 529
(1952).
84 See note 82 supra.
85 If the title clause is meant to imply appropriate contract surveillance, it
appears vague. But see American Motors Corp. v. City of Kenosha, 274 Wis. 315,
80 N.W.2d 363, 368 (1957), appeal docketed, No. 343, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 3095
(U.S. Sept. 24, 1957); Detroit v. Murray Corp., 234 F.2d 380, 382 (6th Cir. 1956),
cert. granted, 352 U.S. 963 (1957).
86 "With the consent of the Contracting Officer and on terms approved by
him, the Contractor may acquire or dispose of property to which title is
vested in the Government pursuant to this clause, and in that event, the
costs allocable to the property so transferred from this contract shall be
eliminated from the costs of contract performance and the Contractor shall
repay to the Government (by cash or credit memorandum) an amount
equal to the unliquidated progress payments allocable to the property so
transferred." General Services Administration Personal Property Management
Regulation No. 33, IA CCH Gov'T CONTRACTS REP. f24,879, Exhibit ) (d) (1956).
87 Id. at 8, para. 10 (b).
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there is reason to question the reliability or accuracy of information furnished by the contractor, no pre-payment audit of the
alleged "costs" on which the contractor seeks a progress payment is required by the regulation .8 But the regulation implies
that the Government's interests are "fully" protected by an
inventory (miscellaneous property) value which is hardly likely
to represent the true value, especially if the Government is
compelled to sell as used material to a third party, 9 and may
be much less than the value of the monies issued to the contractor as progress payments. It appears clear that the "value"
declared by the contractor in support of requests for progress
payments is nothing but the contractor's alleged costs which
may be much greater than the value of what those costs produced and to which the Government takes title. Reservation of
the "rights and remedies of the Government" under the contract, including the right to require the contractor in default
to pay, upon demand, the amount of the unliquidaed progress
payments, 90 further exposes the fallacy of the title which the
regulation declares to "fully" protect the interest of the
Government. As to two types of suggested progress payment
clauses, 91 the regulation requires the contractor to maintain,
not adequate, as required in two other types, 92 but only "reasonable" controls. He is to furnish such statements and information,
not as may be requested, but as may "reasonably" be requested.
And the Government is to be afforded only a "reasonable" opportunity to examine the contractor's books, records, and
accounts.
88 See note 82 supra.
89 THE SALE OF SURPLUS PROPERTY, Committee Print, Sixth Report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, S.
Res. 215, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1956).
90 General Services Administration Personal Property Management Regulation
No. 33, 1A CCH Gov'T CoNTRAcTs REP. 11124,875, 24,879, Exhibit D (h) (i) (1956).
Actually, it appears to have become something in the nature of standard operating
procedure to terminate for convenience rather than for default. H.R. REP. No.
1169, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1957). The result has been to give a creditor status
to some contractors whose contracts should have been terminated for default, so
that they may become the recipient of public funds to which they are not entitled,
rather then becoming potentially indebted to the Government by reason of the
default. Some accounting firms do not list progress payments as a liability despite
the fact that they are an indebtedness. See reports of Touche, Niven, Bailey, and
Smart for the Glenn L. Martin Co. for the years 1952 through 1956, and those of
Lybrand, Ross Bros., and Montgomery for the Curtis-Wright Corporation for the
same period.
91 General Services Administration Personal Property Management Regulation
No. 33, 1 CCH Gov'T CONTRAcTs REP. ffff24,875-77 Exhibits A and B, (1956).
92

Id. at Exhibits D and E.
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GSA's regulation on progress payments, especially the
equivocal nature of the language used, is comparable to
its regulation on Five-Percenters which has completely destroyed the efficacy of the Government standard form contract
covenant against contingent fees, costing the Government millions, if not billions, in public funds. 3 It likewise is a reminder
of GSA's failure to follow the law with respect to the standard
"Disputes" clause. 4 The reader's curiosity may impel him to
wonder why the legislative, or the executive, branch of the Government would permit the publication of a regulation so extremely contrary to the prohibition of section 3648. The answer seems
to be that notwithstanding the great need for aggressive advocacy
of the Government's interest in safeguarding the use of public
funds in a period of unprecedented public spending, such advocacy appears to be much too spotty, undedicated and unorganized to cope with such pressure interests as produced the GSA
regulation. The situation would seem to call for a strong, courageous, well-informed hand in the legislative branch of the Government to demand immediate corrective measures. However,
to date the executive branch appears to have succeeded in making the legislative branch something in the nature of a mere
rubber stamp for its procedures and regulations in more than
one instance9 5 in lieu of the independent check contemplated
by our form of Government. The objectionable features of inviting requests for progress payments are discussed in a subsequent
section of this article with respect to The Federal Pacific Case.
As a concluding observation on the GSA regulation in general, no better comment has been found than that made many
years ago in Pierce v. United States, involving section 3648:
It is not in the power of any one or all of the executive
officers of the government, by any devices which they can employ, to take a case out of the act which by its facts and circumstances falls within its enactment. This power rests with
Congress alone. If, however, that can be done by circumvention
and evasion which may not be done directly, laws and statutes
will be frail things indeed. 96
93 McClelland, The Covenant Against Contingent Fees as a Method of Eliminating the "5-Percenter," 41 CORNELL L.Q. 399, 405-09, 423-25 (1956).
94 McClelland, Government Advocacy As Related To Appeal Procedures Unaccomplished Since the Wunderlich Legislation, 25 FORDHAm L. Rav. 593, 595-96
(1957).
95 An over-developed camaraderie and collaboration-in lieu of a much needed
strictly independent review-in lower echelons of the executive and legislative
branches, which by necessity have great influence in formulating policies and procedures, could account for the situation.
96 1 Ct. Cl. 270, 288 (1865), a]f'd sub. nom., The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 666 (1868).
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If any such illegal and discreditable practice has prevailed
among the officers of the government, no matter how long
continued or extensive, it can never ripen into usage. No
number of breaches of the law can abrogate or repeal it.9r

VIII. THE FEDERAL PACIFIC CASE
The invitation to bid, involved in the contract in a Comptroller General's decision of November 14, 1955,98 to the Federal
Pacific Electric Company offered to make progress payments.
While the invitation, No. 7754, was one issued in 1955, it
appears from the decision that the administrative offer to bidders
to make progress payments was also used approximately four
years earlier. In the case which arose in 1955, Federal Pacific
protested the award to the General Electric Company on the
ground that interest and the administrative expense of making
progress payments to General Electric, which has chosen that
type of payment, would be appreciably more than the difference
of $417 between the General Electric bid of $822,400 and the
sum of $822,817 bid by Federal Pacific which did not request
progress payments. Federal Pacific contended that if properly
evaluated in the lights of the elected method of payment, its bid
would have been lowest by at least $3,000 and probably by as
much as $10,000.
Federal Pacific argued that progress payments cause more
administrative work than one final payment and that the Government incurs additional cost in the form of interest by being
required to pay a sum of money sooner than it would otherwise
be required to pay. In that view of the matter, the complainant
contended the Government is required to take such cost into
consideration in evaluating the bids under the phrase "other
factors" contained in the invitation.
The Comptroller noted that no specific basis for evaluation
between the two methods of payment was provided in the
invitation to bids and that apparently none had been provided
in any other invitation where the provision was used. It was
reported that such a factor had never been taken into consideration by the Department of the Interior in evaluating bids for
award under similar circumstances. Yet, in obvious conflict with
such an administrative policy, the Department's invitation expressly notified bidders that whenever applicable, elements or

9T

Id. at 291.

98

35 CoMP. GEN. 282 (1955-56).
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factors not specifically mentioned as provided therein, such
as the cost of inspection, "or any other element or factor in
adition to that of price which would affect the final cost to the
Government, will be taken into consideration in making
award." 99 And directly beneath that statement, as the last item
of factors related to the award to be made, bidders were requested to indicate in the space provided, the basis of payment
(progress or otherwise) desired.
The invitation was said to contain definite criteria for the evaluation of bids, including discounts, potential devices, engineer's
travel expenses, but no specific provision to the effect that the
basis of payment elected by the bidders would be a factor in evaluation. In the absence of such a specific provision and of specific
criteria set forth in the applicable invitation or regulations, the
Comptroller General expressed the view that the cost of additional administrative expense and interest which might be involved in making progress payments was to indefinite and speculative to be made an evaluation factor. In those circumstances
the Comptroller held that his office was not warranted in concluding that the award was without authority or in violation of
law.
The case seems noteworthy in several respects. In the first
place, the Department of the Interior had no authority to make
progress payments. What authority it ever had was under title
II of the First War Powers Act and Executive Orders Nos. 9055
and 10298 issued pursuant to that act; and, at the time the bid
invitation involved was issued, there had been no determination by the incumbent President, as required by the act, 10 0 that
progress payments by Interior were necessary to facilitate the
national defense. 0 1 And even if such a determination may be
said to have been made, neither the act nor the Executive
Orders contemplate the issuance of progress payments without
regard to the needs of the contractor and his essentialty to the
national defense. Moreover, the agencies have indicated they
are not using title 11102 for progress payments. Thus, not only
99
100

Id. at 283.
McClelland, The Administration of Title H of the First Var Poiers Act, 61

DICK. L. REv.215, 226-29 (1957).
101 Nor does it appear that the Interior Department presented any facts to show
that the national defense was involved.
102

Bachman, Defense Department Contract Financing, 25 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav.

228, 230-31 (1957). While the reference is limited to the Defense Department, the
indications are that the Interior policy is the same. S. REP. No. 1152, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1957); 103 CoNo. REc. 15062-64 (daily ed. Aug. 29, 1957).
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the award but the bid invitation as well was without authority
of law.
Although the Interior invitation should have been reissued
without reference to progress payments since the Department
had no authority to make them, much less offer them in its bid
invitations, further analysis is demanded, especially in the light
of another Comproller General decision antedating that rendered in the FederalPacific case.
It is reported' 0 3 that in that case the invitation made no
provision concerning progress payments. The holding is said
to have been that bids conditioned upon the making of progress
payments must be rejected as unresponsive, "premised upon the
point that progress payments are materially beneficial." Since
a contract with progress payment provisions was regarded as
substantially more advantageous to the contractor than the
same contract without progress payments, it was reasoned that
a bid conditioned upon progress payments does not conform to
invitations that make no mention of progress payments, and that
an award made on such a bid would not meet the statutory
requirements for free and full competition and conformity to
invitations.
The conclusion impelled by that reasoning would seem to be
that if progress payments are of such significance as to be
"materially beneficial" and "substantially more advantageous."
appropriate use of public funds in procurement requires that
administrative regulations should contain these criteria for evaluating the factor of progress payments. Yet these were the considerations ignored by the Comptroller General in the Federal
Pacific case as being too speculative. If such criteria do not
exist, and therefore no such evaluation is possible, it would
seem that the Federal Pacific bid invitation, which gave the
false impression that the type of payment would be a factor
in making the award, was an irresponsible act of the Department as well as a reckless use of public funds, and should have
been cancelled. Otherwise the public interest is prejudiced by
an administrative policy which merely pays lip service to the
basic, well established principle that in advertised competitive
procurement the Government cannot pay more than the lowest
responsible bid price established after considering all elements
103

'Whelan, Government Supply Contracts: Progress Payments Based on Costs;

The New Defense Regulations, 26 FORDHAM L. REv. 224, 237 n.56, (1957), citing an
unpublished decision of the Comptroller General. Ms. CoMP. GEN. DEC. B-128454,
Oct. 11, 1956.
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or factors affecting the final cost. At the same time, such a policy
appears most unfair to bidders because it has a tendency to cause
some to lose awards by bidding high enough to avoid the
necessity of demanding progress payments in their bids, thus
making their bids too high to compete with another bidder who
may know from previous experience or through unpublicized
information that notwithstanding the language in its bid invitation, the Department actually disregards the factor of progress
payments in evaluating bids.
The policy also seems to be contradictory to what appears
to have existed in the Department of Defense prior to November
16, 1956, when that Department issued a directive that all bid
invitations shall state that bids including requests for progress
payments will be evaluated on an equal basis with those not
including requests for progress payments.1 04 That requirement
is similar to the statement found in the recent GSA regulation
on progress payments heretofore considered. Both statements
have been associated with a recommendation of the First Progress Report of the Cabinet Committee on Small Business, which
sought procedures designed to insure that a need by a bidder for
progress or advance payments will not be treated as a handicap
in awarding a contract. 105 The irony in the situation is not
limited to the fact that the Cabinet Committee ignored the
complete lack of authority in most agencies to make progress
payments. It also discloses that what those who previously
sought progress payments feared as inequality of position in the
bid evaluation processes has by the efforts of that group of
bidders become an inequality for those who do not seek progress
payments. For if the latter are expected to bid a price which will
have some reasonable likelihood of competing with the former,
they must also seek progress payments since otherwise that price
will reflect interest costs borne by them rather than by the Federal
Government. The result is that those companies which can and
should operate without progress payments, are compelled to
request them to avoid the possibility of giving some competitors
an advantage. Such a result would seem to be another reflection
of levelling processes that are as stultifying and destructive of
private initiative as other aspects of centralized governmental
policies which tend to lower previous levels of individual enterDepartment of Defense Directive No. 7800.4, 1 CCH GOV'T
23,126 (1956).

104

105

CONTRACTS

REP.

Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 85th Cong.,

Ist Scss. 94 (1957).
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prise and gumption. In other words, the encouragement of administrative policy such as that involved in the Federal Pacific
case and in the Defense and GSA regulations has foreboding
implications equally if not more serious than the fact that the
policy is projected without authority and in defiance of the law.
The Federal Pacific case appears as a good illustration that
the use of progress payments by the executive agencies has proceeded far beyond small business. One look at the balance sheets
of any one of a number of large aircraft companies 08 today will
show how far the Defense Department has gone since the necessity for progress payments - as well as advance payments was presented to Congress as limited to small business. 10 7 Another look at the great unliquidated volume of those payments
should show why there is much cause for concern as to whether,
aside from its illegality, the executive policy on progress payments has not far exceeded what is good for either General
Electric or the country. 10 8
IX.

CERTAIN SERious EFFECTS ON THE MONEY MARKET

The letter of December 12, 1953, from the Commanding
General of the Signal Corps Supply Agency, Philadelphia,
to contractors doing business with that agency announced that
the authority of contracting officers to grant progress payments
had been withdrawn and stated that the withdrawal of that
authority was "one of a number of actions being taken to
decrease the expenditure of public funds and keep within the
national debt limitation of $275 billion."'1 9 The relationship
betweeri progress payments and the problem of keeping within
the national debt limtiation would seem fairly obvious in the
106 See, for example, the balance sheets for the following years on the CurtisWright Corporation and the Glenn L. Martin Co., which disclose progress payments
as follows:
Glenn L. Martin
Curtis-Wright
$ 34,711,046.00
$15,139,640.00
1956
54,866.356.00
18,938,244.00
1955
80,979,401.00
38,155,012.00
1954
122,933,535.00
56,912,420.00
1953
80,165,533.00
56,088,200.00
1952
107 S. REP. No. 911. 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1941); Hearing to Expedite Naval
Shipbuilding, the Hduse Armed Services Committee, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 11, 16, 17
(1940).
108 With' due apologie, to a former Secretary of 'Defense to whom a similar
statement has been attributed with resict to General M6oors, but not related to
progress payments.
109 Hearings before a Subcoinmijtee of the Senate Select Committee on Small
Business, on Participationof Small Business in Military Procurement,83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 333 (1954).
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light of unaccounted for balances of such payments in sums of
approximately 4'/2 billion dollars at year's end, of which a very
substantial portion 1" seems to have been made without authority
and in direct violation of a statutory prohibition. The relationship is perhaps more obvious when the problem of keeping
defense spending within the national debt limitation is shown
to be so great that an announced addition of only $400 million
to a defense budget of $38 billion makes headline news."' Coming as it did on the heels of much speculation as to whether the
Russian Sputnik would mean more defense spending on missiles
and similar projects, the news story seemed to have more significance in its implications than in the actual statements it
contained. In other words, when it appears that the national
defense is jeopardized by a lack of funds which may have been
caused in no small part by liberality, and possible gross incompetence, in making progress payments which are contrary to
law, a question may well arise as to whether, irrespective of
intent, administrative violations of statutory prohibitions on the
use of public funds may not be as deadly destructive of the
national well-being as any other component of what frequently
is classified as a fifth column.
Specific recognition of the effect of progress payments appears
in the recent report that to assist in compelling a restoration
of its spending to conform to the budget of the Department of
Defense, which in the fiscal 1958's first quarter, spent its money
at the rate of $40 billion annually, or $2 billion more than its
38 billion dollar budget, the Air Force proposed a temporary
cut averaging 25 per cent in its monthly progress payments for
aircraft production." 2 Other indications of grave consequences
which flow from administrative violations of the statutory prohibition against the advance of public funds are shown in the
G6vernment's report on October 17, 1957, that it would pay
an interest rate of 47Y113per cent on certain short term bonds involving $750 million.

110 The Army and 'Air Force [with no authority to make progress paymer.M]
accounted for almost half of the unliquidated amount shown as of Dec. 31, 1954.
Hearings before a Subcommittee on the Senate Select Committee on Small Business,
on Participationof Small Business in Military Procurement, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
257 (19 5 ).
111

Washington, D.C., Evening Star, Oct. 30, 1957,

§ A,

p. 1, col. 1.

112
113

Time, Oct. 28,.1957, p. 89, .l,1.
Washington, D.C., Evening Star, Oct. 19, 1957,

§ B,

p. 1, col. 1.
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The Treasury needed some "ready cash" which it normally
would have obtained from the public by issuing bonds of indebtedness bearing 2 or possibly 3 per cent interest. However,
the national debt limitation of $275 billion presented a tough
problem since the Treasury could borrow only $14 billion more
before reaching the national debt limitation. Since the Federal
National Mortgage Association (known as Fanny May), a government agency, owed the Government $1.7 billion, the Treasury Department had the Association offer $750 million in interest bearing notes which the Treasury thought would require
an interest rate of 47/8 per cent to make them readily marketable.
Thus, the financial condition of the Government has become
so acute in its efforts to keep within the national debt limitation
that the Treasury Department in seeking to obtain approximately 11/2 billion dollars, finds it necessary to offer still higher rates
of interest regardless of the fact that it adds to the depletion of a
money market which for some time has been considered altogether too tight.
While the Government was able to secure three-quarters of
a billion dollars without increasing the threat to the national
debt limitation, the cost to the public was high. The cost of the
higher interest rate has been estimated to be approximately $5
million. 114 Government bond prices declined. Fanny May's own
interest costs were expected to increase approximately $18
million, which would be passed on to the borrowing public. If
the Government as well as the public must pay higher interest
rates because the Government has been spending its borrowings
too fast, it seems most appropriate to be fully aware of the
manner in which those borrowed funds are spent as well -as
being informed as to the subject matter purchased. When the
situation becomes so acute that the Government becomes
"hard-put" for a mere three-quarter of a billion dollars, it would
seem of more than passing interest to know that at the end
of the year, for a consecutive period of at least three years, the
Government has been "holding the .bag" for over $4 billion in
unliquidated progress payments paid by executive agencies
without any evidence of authority for such payments except for
the specific legislation heretofore mentioned. Some part of that
$4 billion would have been quite useful when the Treasury was
casting about for three. quarters of $1 billion. The interest paid
by the Government on the $4 billion which the agencies have
114

Id. at p. 2, col. 3.
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failed to charge to the beneficiaries of the progress payments
might well have compensated the Government for the $5 million
extra interest it was compelled to pay in issuing at 47/8 per cent
the Fanny May notes. These in turn very likely would have been
unnecessary had the executive agencies not created an unliquidated progress payment indebtedness of over $4 billion. Moreover, it is conceivable that the cost of administering the unlawful progress payments would closely approximate a substantial
part of that three-quarter of a billion dollars sought by the
Treasury Department. Perhaps, this sort of situation was in the
mind of the commanding general at Philadelphia when he
attempted to curb the use of progress payments "to keep within
the national debt limitation of $275 billion." To determine more
exactly how the proponents of progress payments in larger
amounts, regardless of the law, prevailed at that time over
those who four years ago must have foreseen some, if not all
of the evils in the matter, could be determined only by an
examination of the files as well as the individuals involved. Yet
the efforts so far by Congress seem to be to determine why
progress payments are not used more liberally rather than to
determine the authority for using them and to hold duly accountable those who are responsible for violating the statutory
prohibition.
So long as a policy of perpetuating errors to save face is pursued, the public can expect no respite from the accelerated
spiral of Government expenditures with resultant higher taxes
and a gradual lowering of the real"r5 standard of living. At one
time, various committees of Congress were much concerned by
the extent to which the national budget was being drained by
Five-Percenters. 116 Long, expensive hearings were held, which
disclosed the fabulous amounts which the Government was losing annually by reason of unlawful payments to those agents.
Nevertheless, Congress has never followed through on the matter
to compel enforcement of the contract provision with respect to
such agents. The result is that the Government has continued

115

That is, in the terms of the life to be enjoyed on the basis of one's "real

wages." FisHER, Ta

NATURE OF CAPITAL AND INCOME 104 (1906).

116 HearingsBefore the House Naval Affairs Committee Investigating the National
Defense Program, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1185 (1942); H. REP. No. 2356, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1942); Hearings Before the Investigating Subcommittee, Senate Committee
on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Investigating "Influence in Government Procurement," 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
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with no one making any effective
to lose large sums of money
7
attempt to recover them.1
XII.

SUMMARY

Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes prohibits advances of
public funds, including progress payments, in any case. The
prohibition cannot legally be avoided without the enactment
of "other law." Recognition, by both the executive and legislative branches of the Government, of the inflexibility of the
prohiibtion against progress payments is conclusively shown in
the various statutes, especially the First War Powers Act, the
act of August 2, 1946, and the Armed Services Procurement
Act of 1947, which from time to time have been sought and
obtained by the executive agencies to avoid the prohibition
against advances of public funds generally. Executive agencies
some time ago abandoned the previous policy of seeking legal,
statutory approval for progress payments such as they had
sought and obtained under the First War Powers Act which
required a determination by the President that progress payments were necessary to facilitate the prosecution of the War or,
later, to facilitate the national defense. In lieu of that policy, the
agencies have proceeded to substitute their own determination,
without statutory approval, that the Comptroller General's decision in the Security Steel case, and similar cases, is sufficient
authority to disregard the plain language of the prohibitory
statute, which bars progress payments "in any case," and sufficient as a substitute for the enactment of statutory exceptions.
Abandonment of the War Powers Act, which actually became
inoperative not later than June 30, 1953, is disclosed by the
law review articles of a Defense Department representative and
is confirmed by its general counsel's letter of August 25, 1957,
to Senator Eastland. Executive reliance on the Comptroller General's decisions is completely unjustifiable in the light of the
plain and distinct language of section 3648 and is in direct
conflict with the official position of the Government as to the
necessity for expressed legislative sanction on all exceptions
to the statute. The equation in the decisions, upon which
the executive agencies rely, is a false one because it attempts
to equate title to the delivery specifically required by section
3648, by the use of language which purports to justify an
exception to the statute which contains specific language ex117 See McClelland, The Covenant Against Contingent Fees As A Method of
Elimnating the "5-Percenter," 41 CORNELL L.Q. 399, 424-25 (1956).
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pressly excluding any exception. The executive substitute of
title, for the delivery required by the statute, is at best illusory
and precarious and falls far short of fully protecting the Government's interests. Therefore, neither the Comptroller's decisions
nor the equation used in them furnishes any legal authority for
circumventing the prohibitory statute. The executive agencies
know this, officially, and therefore noticeably refrain from stating an authority in their regulations on progress payments.
Nevertheless, the General Services Administration has sought
and somehow obtained the Comptroller General's approval of
its regulation despite that official's recognition at the time of the
1946 amendment to section 3648, and at various times before
and since, that it is necessary to create legislative exceptions to
avoid the general rule that the advance of public money is prohibited by law.
The Federal Pacific case is a high water mark in disclosing
the executive agency contempt for the prohibition of section
3648. No approval of the agency's proposal to make progress
payments was sought from the Comptroller General, as in the
Security Steel case. Instead, the matter reached the attention
of the Comptroller General because the effect of the agency's
procedure was to compel one of the bidders to seek progress
payments which the law prohibits!
The fact that executive agencies have permitted the unliquidated balances of progress payments to accumulate to the
extent of over $4 billion at year's end alone would seem to
suggest the need for an investigation of the entire progress payment program. The fact that the program has been proceeding
in defiance of the law to the extent that it has been a substantial
factor in creating a tight money market and in the recent increase
of $5 billion in the national debt limitation should make an
investigation imperative.
The negative effects of the administrative weaknesses of the
program, on the protection intended in requiring free and fully
competitive bidding for Government contracts, may be as serious
as any other aspect.
Congress and the President conceivably can be, if they have
not been, misled by executive procedures which fail officially to
disclose by regulation or otherwise that in making progress payments, the executive agencies are, and have been violating the
statute without express or implied legislative sanction.
Those who still may find it difficult to believe that the executive agencies would be using public funds in such disregard of
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the law need only again read the quotation at the beginning of
this article and then refer to the pirpose of a current investiga118
tion by the Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight
stated as follows: "[T]o go into the administration of the laws
to see whether or not the laws as intended by the Congress were
being carried out or whether they were being repealed or revamped by those who administer them." 119 While that subcommittee is limited to matters of interstate and foreign commerce,
it might well be profitably used in matters of Government contracts. Establishment of that subcommittee is not the first Congressional expression of the need for determining the extent to
which executive agencies actually follow the law. 12 0
It sems very probable that there has never been a subject
like progress payments on which so much has been said officially, with so little authority to say it, and With respect to which the
names of those in high authority have been associated in an
give to aii y nothingniess a local fiabitation and a
attempt12"to
1
name."

118 Hearing Before a Subcommittee. of the House .Contmitte on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
119 Id. at 1.
120 See Sparkman, The Administration.of Title 11, First War Powers Act, 1941,
14 U. Prir. L. REv. 303, 317-18 (1953): "This iieans that oftentimes errors of interpretation will not come to light until much mischief has been done.... There should
be a definite procedure'whereby the Congress or its committees should be enabled
speedily to redirect agencies of the executive branch where they are found to be
misguided in their interpretation of a federal statute."
121 Shakespeare, "A Midsummer Night's Dream," act V, sc. 1, 1. 7.

